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Abstract— Attack graph approach is a common tool for the 
analysis of network security. However, analysis of attack graphs 
could be complicated and difficult depending on the attack graph 
size. This paper presents an approximate analysis approach for 
attack graphs based on Q-learning. First, we employ multi-host 
multi-stage vulnerability analysis (MulVAL) to generate an attack 
graph for a given network topology. Then we refine the attack 
graph and generate a simplified graph called a transition graph. 
Next, we use a Q-learning model to find possible attack routes  that 
an attacker could use to compromise the security of the network. 
Finally,  we evaluate the approach by applying it to a typical IT 
network scenario with specific services, network configurations, 
and vulnerabilities. 
Keywords— cyber security; reinforcement learning; Q-learning;  
attack graph  
I. INTRODUCTION  
    Computer networks are often connected to the Internet which 
is inherently an insecure network and therefore they will be a 
target for cyber-attacks.  Moreover, due to weaknesses in 
technical design, configurations, and security policies of the 
network equipment and services, vulnerabilities are 
commonplace in computer networks. Therefore, an attacker can 
combine vulnerabilities in different ways and incrementally 
penetrate the network and compromise critical network 
resources. Proactive security measurements are vital to 
protecting the network against highly sophisticated malicious 
activities. Tracking vulnerabilities and finding the 
interconnectivity between them is one important measurement 
that can reduce the impact of an attack by showing the chain of 
vulnerabilities that lead to a successful attack. However, this 
process is a laborious, time-consuming, and complex task which 
requires a great deal of knowledge which is also prone to error 
[1].  
    The automation of vulnerability assessment is necessary in 
order to understand the overall security posture of a network.  
The attack graph technique is an important approach that 
simulates possible attack paths in a network [1, 2]. Quantitative 
analysis of attack graphs can reveal important information that 
can help security practitioners to defend their network 
proactively. Q-learning is a form of model-free reinforcement 
learning [3] can be used to analyze an attack graph. Here, an 
agent tries an action among all the possible actions in a 
particular state, and evaluates the results based on the reward it 
receives. The agent tries all the possible actions in all states 
repeatedly, and overall it learns which are best, and decides 
based on a long-term discounted reward [3]. If we consider an 
attacker as the agent, we can rank different paths in the attack 
graph based on attacker maximum reward (for instance, the 
reward could be the amount of damage an action causes to the 
network) using Q-learning. 
In this paper, a security approach is proposed to find optimal 
action policy to defend against how an attacker might 
compromise the security of a given network. This optimal 
action policy could be used to improve the network security. 
First, we employ MulVAL [4] to find all the attack paths in the 
network. Second, we use an algorithm [5] to refine the attack 
graph to produce a transition graph which is used to model the 
environment for Q-learning. Furthermore, this framework 
makes it easy to understand and analyze the attack graph for 
monitoring purposes [5]. We then use CVSS to model the 
reward system for attacker’s possible actions and apply Q-
learning to find attacker’s possible actions. The rest of the paper 
is organized as follows: in section II, we review some work in 
this field. In section III, the details of the framework are 
presented. In section IV, we give an example to evaluate the 
framework. Finally, in section V, we compare the work with 
similar work in the field and conclude the paper.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
    Cyber vulnerability analysis is “the process of identifying the 
vulnerabilities in a system and prioritizing them according to 
their severity”. It assists in discovering weaknesses in a given 
system in the application of proper patches [6]. In [7-9], the 
authors provide a standard security evaluation baseline. 
However, it does not include quantitative measurements. To 
address this issue, CVSS [9] was developed by NIST as a 
standard composite scoring system model. This model is usable 
and understandable by security practitioners. The issue is that 
CVSS considers vulnerabilities as isolated entities. In case there 
are multiple vulnerabilities, CVSS has no foresight of 
exploitable possible interrelationships between the 
vulnerabilities in the system. Further work was done in [11-16], 
to address the aforementioned problem. The attack graph 
technique is a common technique for the evaluation of network 
security. It helps to automatically identify possible multi-stage 
attacks in enterprise networks. The focus of the authors in [16, 
17-18] is to improve the attack graph generation and reduce the 
complexity of employed algorithms. The main advantage of 
their approach is the consideration of interrelationships between 
vulnerabilities in the system. However, attack graphs are too 
large and complex to be interpreted by security practitioners. 
This problem has been addressed using various approaches [15, 
20-21]. These attempts try to improve the visualization of an 
attack graph through abstraction [15], data reduction [19], and 
user interaction [21]. 
    Attack graph techniques draw all the possible attack paths. 
However, it is necessary to integrate the attack graph with some 
sort of metric to measure the validity and possibility of each 
attack path. In other words, there is a need to establish security 
frameworks capable of measuring the security risks in 
enterprise networks objectively. 
III. SECURITY FRAMEWORK USING ATTACK GRAPH AND Q-
LEARNING 
    The proposed framework includes several steps. The first step 
is to reconnoiter the network which includes gathering 
information about the current state of the network. This includes 
a list of known vulnerabilities, configured network services and 
access rules. This information is necessary to model the 
environment to apply Q-learning. The second step is generating 
the attack graph. It shows the interdependencies between 
vulnerabilities in the system based on network connectivity (all 
possible attack paths). We use MulVAL to generate the attack 
graph. MulVAL is an open source tool and the complexity of the 
attack graph generation algorithm grows between O(n2) and 
O(n3) [4]. Then we simplify the attack graph and generate a 
transition graph [5]. The final step is to use the transition graph 
to model the environment and the reward system for the agent 
(attacker) and apply Q-learning which returns the possible routes 
for the attacker to reach the goal. We use an example scenario to 
show the aforementioned steps and evaluate the proposed 
framework. 
A. Q-learning Algorithm  
    Reinforcement learning techniques can be used for the 
quantitative security evaluation of large-scale enterprise 
networks. One such reinforcement learning technique is Q-
learning [3]. This is a simple approach for agents to take actions 
optimally in controlled Markovian domains [22]. This model 
seeks to find an optimal action selection policy that produces 
maximal cumulative rewards using a trial-and-error approach 
[23]. Here, the problem model consists of an agent, states and 
the agent has a set of actions per state. The agent’s movement 
between states is called an action. Taking an action by the agent 
in a specific state results in a numerical value reward. The 
agent’s aim is to maximize its total reward. The quality of each 
action is decided based on the associated reward which is a 
feedback from the environment. Q-learning in its simplest form 
which is known as one-step Q-learning is defined by the 
following equations (1) [22]. 
 
𝑄(𝑆𝑡 , 𝐴𝑡) ← 𝑄(𝑆𝑡 , 𝐴𝑡) + 𝛼 [𝑅𝑡+1 +  𝛾 max
𝑎
 𝑄(𝑆𝑡+1 , 𝑎) −  𝑄(𝑆𝑡 , 𝐴𝑡)] 
(1) 
𝑄 ∶ 𝑆 × 𝐴 → 𝑅 
        Here, 𝑆 is a set of states and 𝐴 is a set of actions per state. 
By performing one action 𝐴𝑡  𝜖 𝐴, the agent moves from one 
state to another state.𝑅𝑡is the reward observed with the current 
state 𝑆𝑡. Factor α is a learning rate parameter between 0 and 1, 
setting it to 0 means that the Q-values are never updated. Factor 
𝛾 is called the discount factor, which is a number between 0 and 
1. If 𝛾 is closer to 0, the agent tends to consider an immediate 
reward, but, if it is closer to 1, the agent is willing to delay the 
reward. In this case, Q is the learnt action-value function, 
independently of the policy being followed, approximates Q* 
as optimal action-value function which is defined by the 
following equations (2) [23]. 
 
                     𝑄𝑛(𝑆𝑡, 𝐴𝑡) → 𝑄
∗(𝑆𝑡, 𝐴𝑡)  𝑎𝑠  𝑛 →  ∞                                      (2) 
 
    Here the agent without prior knowledge explores the state 
until it reaches the goal. The exploration that starts from initial 
state and ends in goal state that is called an episode. Once the 
agent arrives at the goal state, the agent starts the next episode 
until the algorithm reaches the convergence. Fig. 1 shows the 
interaction between the agent and the environment in 
reinforcement learning [23]. 
 
Fig. 1. Reinforcement learning flowchart 
 




1: \\ Input: State/Reward (Environment) Matrix (R),  
2:                Discounted factor(𝛾), 
               Learning rate (α) 
3: \\Output: Optimal action selection policy (Matrix Q) 
4: \\ States/Actions: State: St ϵ S/Action: At ϵ A 
5: Procedure qlearning (R, learning rate) 
6:        Initialize Q  as 0s (arbitrarily for all state-action pairs in R)     
7:        For  each Exploration do 
8:           Select a random initial state (St ϵ S) 
9:           While current state != goal state do 
10:              Select one action from all possible actions for the current  
              State 
11:              Take the action and observe the outcome state  
              and reward         
12:              Update Q: 𝑄(𝑆𝑡, 𝐴𝑡) ← 𝑄(𝑆𝑡, 𝐴𝑡) + 𝛼[𝑅𝑡+1 + 
𝛾 max
𝑎
𝑄(𝑆𝑡+1 , 𝑎) − 𝑄(𝑆𝑡, 𝐴𝑡) 
13:              Current state = next state        
14:           End While 
15:        End For   
16:        Return Q           
17: End Procedure 
 
     In the above algorithm, the calculation of the matrix Q is 
based on a single goal. However, in attack graphs, usually there 
is more than one goal. We alter the Q-learning algorithm to 
apply to attack graph scenarios. Details of the algorithm to 
analyze the attacker behavior are described in Algorithm Q-
learning-Attack-Graph. We use sub-matrixes of R (Matrix r) to 
generate a Q matrix for each goal. In order to do that each time 
one goal is chosen and the remaining goals along with their 
corresponding rows and columns will be removed from the 
matrix R (Algorithm Q-learning-Attack-Graph, line 5, 6) and the 
result will be the submatrix r as reward matrix for the Q-
learning. 
    Algorithm Q-learning-Attack-Graph 
1: \\ Input: State/Reward (Environment) Matrix (R) is a n×n and n is      
               the number vertices in transition graph,  
               Discounted factor(𝛾),  
               Learning rate (α) 
2: \\Output: Attacker’s optimal action selection  policy to   
                compromise security of the network (Matrix Q) 
3: \\ States/Actions: State: St ϵ S 
                             Action: At ϵ A 
4: Procedure Q-learning-Attack Graph (R, learning rate) 
5:     For all goals in the transition graph do 
6:         r = remove rows and columns of all goals except the current  
              goal from matrix R  
7:         Initialize Q  as 0s (arbitrarily for all state-action pairs in r)   
8:         \\ Q Calculation   
9:         For  each Exploration do 
10:               Select a random initial state (St ϵ S) 
11:               While current state != goal state do 
12:                  Select one action from all possible actions for the current  
                  State 
13:                 Take the action and observe the outcome state  
                  and reward         
14:                 Update Q : 𝑄(𝑆𝑡, 𝐴𝑡) ← 𝑄(𝑆𝑡, 𝐴𝑡) + 𝛼[𝑅𝑡+1 +  
𝛾 max
𝑎
𝑄(𝑆𝑡+1 , 𝑎) − 𝑄(𝑆𝑡, 𝐴𝑡) 
15:                 Current state = next state        
16:              End While 
17:         End For   
18:         Return Q 
19:     End For       
20: End Procedure 
 
B. Modelig the Environment 
    In order to apply Q-learning, we need to model the 
environment. Here, the environment is modelled by an attack 
graph which consists of all the possible attack paths in a given  
network with specific configuration and the attacker is the agent 
which is located on the Internet. We use MulVAL [4] to 
generate the attack graph and use an approch proposed in [5] to 
simplify the attack graph (transition graph). The transition 
graph is used to model the simplified environment. In this case, 
an attacker can move between the nodes in any direction in the 
graph until the attacker arrives in one of the goal states, where 
the attacker will stay forever. We also need to introduce a kind 
of reward value to each edge of the graph. We use Common 
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) to assign reward values 
based on vulnerabilities in the system. 
IV.     EXAMPLE TO EVALUATE THE FRAMEWORK 
A. Topology,  System Configuration   
    The network topology diagram is illustrated in Fig. 2. There 
are three distinct services including a webServer and a 
mailServer in the same subnet and a fileServer on another 
subnet. It has also two distinct subnets (subnet_1 and subnet_2 
in Fig. 2). The client in subnet_1 is running Windows 2000 and 
client in subnet_2 is running Internet Explorer. There is also a 
Workstation, which is running Acrobat in the same subnet as the 
fileServer. 
 
    There is a perimeter firewall. The network connectivity in this 
network topology is based on firewall rules described as follows: 
(i) The attacker is located on the Internet and has access to the 
webServer through the HTTP protocol and HTTP port, (ii) There 
is bidirectional connectivity between webServer and other 
machines in the network. (iii) The webServer and fileServer 
have access to each other through NFS protocol and NFS port, 
(iv) fileServer, subnet_1 and subnet_2 have access to the 
Internet through the HTTP protocol and the HTTP port, (v) The 
fileServer and Workstation have access to each other through the 
NFS protocol and the NFS port. 
     There are four distinct software vulnerabilities in the 
topology. National Vulnerability Database (NVD) assigns a 
unique identifier to each known vulnerability. These identifiers 
help security practitioner to obtain information about 
vulnerabilities. The webServer contains a vulnerability named 
‘CVE-2002-0392’. This is a weakness that allows remote 
attackers to cause a denial of service and possibly execute 
arbitrary code. The client in subnet_1 contains a vulnerability 
named ‘CVE-2010-0483’. This weakness is related to 
vbscript.dll in VBScript 5.1,6,7, and 8 in Windows 2000 SP4, 
when Internet Explorer (IE) is used allows the attacker to 
execute arbitrary code. The client in subnet_2 contains a 
vulnerability named ‘CVE-2010-0490’. This is a weakness in IE 
6, 7 and 8 with the possibility that remote intruder can execute 
arbitrary code on the target machine. The fileServer contains a 
vulnerability named ‘CVE-2010-0492’ that is related to 
Windows 2003 SP2 with the possibility that attacker can bypass 
intended IPv4 source address restrictions. Table 1 summarizes 
the vulnerabilities in the system. 
         
Internet














Fig. 2. Network Topology 
Table 1: Vulnerabilities in the Topology 
List of 
Vulnerabilities 
Vulnerabilities and Associated Machines 
Machine Vulnerability ID (NVD) 
1 webServer CVE-2002-0392 
2 subnet_1 CVE-2010-0483 
3 subnet_2 CVE-2010-0490 
4 fileServer CVE-2010-0812 
 
B. Generating Attack Graph and Transition Graph 
    We use MulVAL [4] to generate the attack graph. Fig. 3 
































Fig. 3. Attack Graph with nodes’ description 
1,"execCode(mailServer,root)","OR",0 
2,"RULE 4 (Trojan horse installation)","AND",0 
3,"accessFile(mailServer,write,'/export')","OR",0 




8,"RULE 2 (remote exploit of a server program)","AND",0 
9,"netAccess(webServer,tcp,80)","OR",0 





                       0392',httpd,remoteExploit,privEscalation)","LEAF",1 
15,"execCode(subnet_1,user)","OR",0 
16,"RULE 3 (remote exploit for a client program)","AND",0 
17,"accessMaliciousInput(subnet_1,victim_1,windows_2000)","OR",0 





                     0483',windows_2000,remoteClient,privEscalation)","LEAF",1 
23,"execCode(subnet_2,user)","OR",0 
24,"RULE 3 (remote exploit for a client program)","AND",0 
25,"accessMaliciousInput(subnet_2,victim_2,ie)","OR",0 






32,"RULE 4 (Trojan horse installation)","AND",0 
33,"accessFile(workStation,write,'/export')","OR",0 




38,"RULE 3 (remote exploit for a client program)","AND",0 
39,"accessMaliciousInput(fileServer,victim_3,windows_2003_server)","OR",0 




44,"vulExists(fileServer,'CVE-2010-     
0812',windows_2003_server,remoteClient,privEscalation)","LEAF",1 
     
    There are three different vertices in the attack graph. The 
square vertices (e.g. nodes 11, 22 and 44 in Fig. 3) are related 
to system configuration. For example, firewall rules that let the 
web server be accessible from the Internet or the buggy 
software on a machine. The diamond vertices (e.g. nodes 9, 25, 
and 37 in Fig. 3) represent potential privileges or access that an 
attacker can obtain in the system, e.g., code execution privilege 
on the web server. The elliptical vertices (e.g. nodes 10, 16, and 
24 in Fig. 3)  link preconditions to postconditions. As an 
example, it is necessary for an attacker to have access to a 
machine that has a vulnerability, to be able to exploit the 
vulnerability and obtain privileges. 
    We use the approach proposed in [5] to refine the attach 
graph and generate the transition graph. This graph draws all 
the possible attacker’s movements between vulnerabilities in 
the network and it is simplified to be understood and interpreted 
easily. In previous work the researchers used this graph as a 
transition graph for a Markov model and in this work the 
researchers used it to generate a reward matrix for the Q-
learning model. Fig. 4 shows the refined attack graph using the 
algorithm in [5]. 
C. Modeling the attack graph as Q-learning Environment   
    The transition graph in Fig. 4 is used to model the 
environment. Here, the attacker is the agent which is located on 
the Internet. We represent the attacker’s location, 
vulnerabilities, and attacker goals as vertices (states) and each 
edge represents the possibility of the attacker’s movement and 
it is called an action. In this case, we suppose the attacker can 
move between the nodes in any direction in the transition graph 
until the attacker arrives at one of the goal states. Furthermore, 
we use Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) to 
assign reward values. We use the overall score which includes 
the exploitability rate and impact on the system. If the edge 
leads the attacker to a node with vulnerability (attacker exploits 
the vulnerability) the overall score related to that vulnerability 
will be considered as the reward value. If the edge of the graph 
leads to a goal state (red nodes) the reward will be considered 
as 100 (maximum possible score). Additional looped edges are 
added to the goal vertices with the reward of 100, it is because 
when attacker reaches the goal, the attacker will stay there 
forever. The reward model is shown in Fig. 5. 
    Suppose the attacker is on the Internet which is shown as 
node 12 (green node). The Attacker has the possibility to move 
to four different possible nodes including 14, 22, 30, and 44 that 
each arrow or edge (action) has got the appropriate reward 




Fig. 4. Transition Graph 
 
Attacker Location: 12 
Vertices include vulnerability: 14, 22, 30, 44 















Fig. 5. Graph related modelling the environment 
 
    Suppose the attacker takes the action to go to node 44, now 
there are two options, either to move to node 31 which is a goal 
state and earn 100 points or go back to the starting location with 
the reward of zero. We put the state diagram along with the 
instant reward values (Fig. 5) into the matrix R. The matrix R 
for the diagram in Fig. 5 is shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Matrix R 
 
R 12 14 22 30 44 1 15 23 31 
12 -1 7.5 7.6 9.3 6.5 -1 -1 -1 -1 
14 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 100 -1 -1 -1 
22 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 100 -1 -1 
30 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 100 -1 
44 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 100 
1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 100 -1 -1 -1 
15 -1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 100 -1 -1 
23 -1 -1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 100 -1 
31 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 100 
 
 
    The rows in matrix R represent the states, and the columns 
represent the actions. For instance, R(12, 44) means the attacker 
goes from node 12 to node 44 and earns 6.5 points, and R(15, 
31) means there is no direct edge between these two nodes 
which is shown by a reward of -1. Matrix R represents the 
modeled environment and reward system. Details of  the 
algorithm  to analyze the attacker behavior is described in 
Algorithm (Q-learning-Attack-Graph). First, we use the 
transition graph in Fig. 4 to model our environment then we 
feed the matrix R into our algorithm. 
D. Result and Analysis 
    In this section, we apply the algorithm (Q-learning-Attack-
Graph) on our model which is shown with matrix R. The 
algorithm each time extracts submatrix r from matrix R and 
generates matrix Q for the submatrix r. Fig. 6. shows the 
diagram  after keeping one of the goals (node 1) and removing 
 
 
the other goals (nodes 15, 23, and 31) and corresponding edges. 
Using diagram in Fig. 6 the reward matrix (r) which is a 
submatrix of matrix R is calculated and is shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Matrix r (goal state is 1) 
r 12 14 22 30 44 1 
12 -1 7.5 7.6 9.3 6.5 -1 
14 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 100 
22 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
30 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
44 0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 
1 -1 0 -1 -1 -1 100 
 
    Fig. 7 shows the diagram related to matrix Q after 
convergence. Here the weights on the edges of the graph show 
the reward that will be earned by the attacker by moving 
between different nodes. Using matrix Q the attacker can reach 
the goal state (node 1) from each individual state in the diagram. 
For example, if the attacker is in state 12 (Internet), the attacker 
can use matrix Q to reach the goal state (node 1) as follow: 1) 
from state 12 going to state 14 produces maximum reward 
(325.99). 2) From state 14 going to state 1(goal state) produces 
maximum reward (499.99). Therefore, the sequence of 12, 14, 
and 1 (12 -> 14 -> 1) with the reward of 907.49 is the preferred 











Most Efficient Path from 12 to 1:
 12 -> 14 -> 1
 
Fig. 7. Reward matrix diagram for Goal 1 
 
    The same approch applies for the remaining goals including 
goal 15, goal 23, and goal 31. The results of this Q-learning 
based approach in modelling the possible attack routes by the 
attacker to compromise the different goals in the system is 
summarised in Table 4. 
 






Optimal Path to 







31 12 -> 44 -> 31 906.48 
12 
(Internet) 
1 12 -> 44 -> 31 907.49 
12 
(Internet) 
15 14 -> 12 -> 44 -> 31 907.59 
12 
(Internet) 
23 12 -> 30 -> 23 909.29 
 
 
    Using this information, we can observe the maximum 









Fig. 6. Environment diagram (goal is node 1) 
vulnerabilities in the system and tackle them based on their 
priority. Considering the attacker is on the Internet, if attacker 
compromise goal 23, the reward is 909.29, therefore, it is 
ranked first in terms of importance. Goal 15 and goal 1 are 
ranked as second and third with a reward of 907.5 and 907.49 
respectively. Finally, goal 31 with the maximum reward of 
906.48 is ranked as the least important goal. 
    Fig. 8 demonstrates the convergence of the model (matrix Q) 
when finding the best path, the attacker will take to compromise 
different goals in the system. 
Fig. 8. Q Convergence for all Goals  
 
    Here, the x-axis shows the number of iterations and the y-
axis shows the cumulative reward for each iteration. We ran the 
model for 1000 iterations (400 iterations are plotted) and it took 
around 350 iterations for the model to converge for all 4 
scenarios. The maximum reward for the best path to reach the 
goals is slightly above 900. 
V. CONCLUSION  
        In this work, we have proposed a novel way of assessing 
the security of a computer network based on the application of 
Q-learning to a refined attack graph. The main contribution of 
this paper is modeling the network topology for reinforcement 
learning and altering the Q-learning algorithm to be applicable 
to the vulnerability analysis of computer networks. First, we 
used a transition graph which is a simplified attack graph [5] to 
model the environment. Then we applied the Q-learning 
algorithm to find the possible attack routes which system 
administrators can use to formulate optimal action selection 
policies to patch the vulnerabilities. This is a valid way of 
analysing network security as we know what are the possible 
paths the attacker might take to compromise security and 
system administrators can take appropriate actions to mitigate 
the attacks accordingly. 
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